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COMPETENCE TO PLEAD GUILTY:
A NEW STANDARD
In Sieling v. Eyman,1 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a court may not accept a plea of guilty from a criminal defend-
ant who has been found competent to stand trial unless it also deter-
mines that he is competent to make the waiver of constitutional rights
inherent in a guilty plea.2 Gilbert Sieling was charged with multiple
counts of assault with intent to commit murder and assault with a
deadly weapon.3 After Sieling entered his plea of not guilty, the Ari-
zona trial court granted defense counsel's motion for a pretrial compe-
tency hearing under Rule 250 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure.4 The court appointed two psychiatrists to examine Sieling.
1. 478 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1973).
HEREINAFTER THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS
NOTE:
S. BRAKEL & R. RocK, TaE MENTALLY DISABLED A mn LAw (1971) [herein-
after cited as 13RAKEL & Rock];
H. WEIHOFEN, MENrAL DisoRDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE (1954) [hereinafter
cited as WEmOFEN].
2. The constitutional rights identified by the court as being waived by a guilty
plea were those cited in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969): the fifth
amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination and the sixth amendment rights
to trial by jury and to the confrontation of witnesses. 478 F.2d at 214. However,
it is noted in Heberling, Judicial Review of the Guilty Plea, 7 LINCOLN L. REV. 137,
187 (1973), that a fifth amendment waiver is no longer essential to a valid guilty plea
because in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the Supreme Court held that
a trial court may accept a guilty plea accompanied by protestations of innocence if
there is strong evidence of actual guilt. See also Comment, The Guilty Plea as a
Waiver of Rights and as an Admission of Guilt, 44 TEMPLE L.Q. 540 (1971). In
addition, it is frequently stated that a guilty plea also constitutes a waiver of all non-
jurisdictional defects and defenses, see, e.g., Hughes v. United States, 371 F.2d 694,
696 (8th Cir. 1967), including earlier violations of the defendant's constitutional rights
unless the infringements motivated the guilty plea. Briley v. Wilson, 376 F.2d 802
(9th Cir. 1967). Cf. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). See generally
Bishop, Waivers in Pleas of Guilty, 60 F.R.D. 513 (1974).
3. 478 F.2d at 213.
4. ARIz. RULEs OF CRmMAL PaocnnuRE, rule 250 (1956):
Examination of defendant's mental condition prior to or during trial ....
A. If before or during trial the court has reasonable ground to believe that
the defendant, against whom an indictment has been found or an information
filed, is insane or mentally defective, to the extent that he is unable to under-
stand the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense, the court shall
immediately set a time for a hearing to determine the defendant's mental con-
dition....
Rule 250 and its statutory counterpart, ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. 13-1621A (1972), have
been superseded by Rule 11.1 of the 1973 Amz. RULEs op CRnI~nr. PROCEDURE, effec-
tive September 1, 1973. Rule 11.1 does not, however, make any substantive change.
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When the results of their" examinations conflicted, it appointed a
third; all three psychiatrists agreed that Sieling had been insane at the
time of the offense. Upon the recommendation of two of the three
psychiatrists, however, the court found the defendant competent to
stand trial. One month after the competency hearing and shortly be-
fore the scheduled trial date, Sieling requested permission to change
his plea. After conducting a routine inquiry into the voluntariness of
Sieling's proposed plea and his understanding of the charge, the court
accepted a plea of guilty to the counts of assault with a deadly weapon
and granted the prosecutor's motion to dismiss the remaining counts in
accordance with a "plea bargain." Sieling was sentenced to consecutive
terms amounting to a maximum of sixteen years.5
Arguing that, although competent to stand trial, he had been in-
competent to plead guilty, Sieling petitioned the United States District
Court for a writ of habeas corpus.6 The district court dismissed the
petition7 and Sieling appealed. In a unanimous decision, the Ninth
Circuit reversed. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in West-
brook v. Arizona,8 which recognized a distinction between a defend-
ant's competence to stand trial and his competence to waive the right to
counsel, the court held that neither Sieling's pretrial competency hear-
ing nor the colloquy conducted before entry of his guilty plea suffi-
ciently established his competence to make the "reasoned choice" which
it deemed essential to the validity of a plea of guilty and the waiver of
constitutional rights such a plea entails. 9 The case was remanded to
the district court with instructions to grant the writ of habeas corpus
unless within sixty days the state trial court reviewed the psychiatric
evidence in the record and specifically found Sieling competent to
plead guilty under the "reasoned choice' standard adopted by the appel-
late court.' 0
5. 478 F.2d at 213.
6. Id.
7. Id. The dismissal of Sieling's petition by the United States District Court for
the District of Arizona was unreported.
8. 384 U.S. 150 (1966). See notes 45-48 infra and accompanying text.
9. 478 F.2d at 214-15. It is important to note that Sieling does not require a
finding of competence to plead guilty for every defendant who elects so to plead.
Rather its rule is limited to cases in which the defendant's competence has been put
in issue by an earlier competency hearing or when in some other manner a "substantial
question" has arisen as to a defendant's mental capacity. Id. at 214.
10. Id. at 215-16. The standard adopted by the Sieling court was first suggested
by Judge Hufstedler in her dissent in Schoeller v. Dunbar, 423 F.2d 1183, 1194 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 834 (1970): "A defendant is not competent to plead guilty
if mental illness has substantially impaired his ability to make a reasoned choice among
the alternatives presented to him and to understand the nature of the consequences
of his plea." (Emphasis added.)
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The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Sieling represents an effort to deter-
mine the relationship between two heretofore distinct bodies of law,
each accompanied by its own standards and procedures. The first of
these concerns the defendant's mental capacity to be a party to criminal
proceedings-his competence to stand trial. The second concerns the
general validity of the entry of a guilty plea or a waiver of constitutional
rights. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Westbrook," courts
generally construed these bodies of law to serve separate and unrelated
functions. The Sieling court, however, interpreted Westbrook both to
recognize a conflict between them and to provide the means for its
resolution. In order to assess the correctness of the Sieling decision and
to undersand its implications, it is first necessary to examine briefly
each of these bodies of law-the law of competence to stand trial and
the law governing the validity of a waiver of constitutional rights or the
entry of a guilty plea.
COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL-A STANDARD FOR ALL PURPOSES
It has been held repeatedly that the criminal conviction of an in-
competent defendant is a denial of the due process guaranteed by the
fifth and fourteenth amendments."2 The cases so holding represent a
constitutionalization' 3 of the common law rule forbidding the trial,
11. See notes 45-48 infra and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Bishop v. United States, 350
U.S. 961 (1956); Carroll v. Beto, 421 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1970); Youtsey v. United
States, 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899); United States v. Gundelfinger, 98 F. Supp. 630
(W.D. Pa. 1951). See also 12 ViLL. L. REv. 655 (1967). But cf. Burt & Norris, A
Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. Cm. L. R.v. 66, 75-76
(1972) (contending that due process should not require that a defendant be competent
in order to be tried criminally and that indications by the Supreme Court to the con-
trary have been mere dicta).
13. See BRaAxL & RocK 408; 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 773, 775. Aside from the constitu-
tionalization of the common law rule, the development of constitutional law in
the area of competence in the criminal process has centered upon procedural is-
sues--Sieling thus represents a considerable change of focus. These procedural
developments indicate that the defendant's competence is an absolute constitutional
prerequisite to the validity of the proceedings; the issue of competence undercuts
all other validating standards and procedures. First, the prohibition against subjecting
an incompetent defendant to criminal proceedings is not subject to waiver, either volun-
tary, Seidner v. United States, 260 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1958), or involuntary, Taylor
v. United States, 282 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1960), since such a waiver would by definition
be invalid and its enforcement would deprive the incompetent defendant of most of the
protection of the prohibition. Second, under Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966),
a trial court must hold a hearing on its own initiative when facts come to its attention
which raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's competence to proceed. Third,
absent unusual circumstances, an express finding of competence as a result of such a
hearing will have a res judicata effect sufficient to withstand collateral attack. Han-
son v. United States, 406 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1969). See generally Schoeller
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sentencing, or execution of an incompetent person,14 and precluding
the acceptance of an incompetent's guilty plea. 5 Although variously
stated, the common law standard of competence to stand trial essentially
requires the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist in
one's own defense.' 6  The Supreme Court adopted this standard for
v. Dunbar, 423 F.2d 1183, 1186 (9th Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 834 (1970) (general overview of the procedural aspects of the is-
sue of competence to stand trial in federal habeas corpus proceedings; Annot., 7
A.L.R. Fed. 565 (1971). See also Burt & Norris, supra note 12 (argument that it
would be both constitutionally permissible and in the best interests of defendants
and the state to adapt the criminal process so that the defendant can be tried despite
his incompetence).
Until the recent decision of Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), the problem
of the disposition of defendants adjudged incompetent to stand trial strongly influenced
the discussion of issues in this area. See, e.g., Eizenstat, Mental Competency to Stand
Trial, 4 Hnv. Civ. RIGrs-Civ. LID. L. Rnv. 379 (1969); Kaufman, Evaluating Compe-
tency: Are Constitutional Deprivations Necessary?, 10 AM. Gtum. L. Rav. 465 (1972);
Comment, Criminal Law-Insane Persons-Competency to Stand Trial, 59 MICH. L.
REV. 1078 (1961). The general practice-frequently required by statute, see BRAKEL
& Roc 415, Table 11.2, at 444-had been automatically to commit incompetent de-
fendants to state hospitals for the criminally insane until they recovered sufficiently
to proceed. See, e.g., A. MATTHEWS, MENTAL DIsABILITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
133-34 (1970); Kaufman, supra at 466-67, 481; Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial,
81 HAv. L. Rnv. 454, 461-64 (1967). Thus, for many defendants a finding of in-
competence to stand trial amounted to a sentence of life imprisonment without a trial.
A. MATTHEWS, supra at 138; Comment, supra at 1088-90. This practice caused some
commentators to oppose raising the standard for competence. See, e.g., McGarry, Com-
petency for Trial and Due Process via the State Hospital, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 623, 628
(1965); cf. Note, supra at 473 (recommending "narrow construction" of competence
standards). It has led others to recommend the abolition of the incompetence plea alto-
gether. See Burt & Norris, supra note 12. The Supreme Court in Jackson eliminated
much of this problem by holding that it is a violation of due process to hold a defendant
who is incompetent to stand trial longer than is necessary to determine his prospects for
improvement; a permanently incompetent defendant can be committed for an indefi-
nite period only through proper civil proceedings. 406 U.S. at 738. See generally
Comment, An End to Incompetency to Stand Trial, 13 SANTA CLAnA LAw. 560 (1973);
Note, Remedies for Individuals Wrongly Detained in State Mental Institutions Because
of Their Incompetency to Stand Trial: Implementing Jackson v. Indiana, 7 VALPARASo
U.L. REv. 203 (1973).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284 (5th Cir. 1906); Youtsey v.
United States, 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899); Howie v. State, 121 Miss. 197, 83 So. 158
(1919); State v. Smith, 25 N.M. 48, 176 P. 819 (1918); In re Buchanan, 129 Cal. 330,
61 P. 1120 (1900); WEiHoFEN 428-29; Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note
13, at 454.
15. See, e.g., Forthoffer v. Swope, 103 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1939); Youtsey v. United
States, 97 F. 937, 940 (6th Cir. 1899); People v. Maynard, 347 II. 422, 179 N.E. 833
(1932); Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 135 S.W. 327 (1911); A. MATHEws, supra
note 13, at 19; WEIHOFEN 429.
16. WEIHOFEN 439. Few decisions elaborate the standards. It is unclear what de-
gree of participation in the proceedings is required, that is, whether the defendant must
be able to "conduct" his defense, as some variants of the common law standard state,
see, e.g., State v. Sevems, 184 Kan. 213, 219, 336 P.2d 447, 452 (1959); Ex parte
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the federal courts in 1959,17 and this standard may represent a minimum
for the states as well.18  In any event, the law of most states embodies
these requirements for competence to stand trial; nearly half of the
Hodges, 166 Tex. Crim. 433, 314 S.W.2d 581 (1958), or whether the defendant must
merely be competent enough to be fairly defended. A frequently cited case, United
States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284 (5th Cir. 1906), the reported portion of which consists
of an extended jury instruction, seems to adopt the former standard by requiring a
defendant who is the master of his case. According to the ChisoIm court, the defendant
must have ". . . such poise of his faculties as will enable him to rationally and prop-
erly exercise all the rights which the law gives him in contesting an action." Id. at
287. However, since there seem to be no decisions holding a defendant to be incompe-
tent because he is capable only of the much more passive "assistance," it is doubtful
that such a high "ability to make one's own defense" standard is anywhere operative.
Some commentators have criticized the "understand and assist" standard of com-
petence to stand trial because of the degree of participation it seems to allow:
mhis term ["assist"] does not properly reflect the otherwise prevailing no-
tion of the attorney-client relationship, according to which the accused is
dominus litus and his attorney is but agent. Crucial decisions are.., made by
the accused and not by his attorney. H. SILviNG, ESSAYS IN MENrAL CAPAC-
lrY AND CRMINmAL CONDUCT 165 (1967).
Cf. Chernoff & Schaffer, Defending the Mentally IIL Ethical Quicksand, 10 AM. CalM.
L. REV. 505, 522 (1972). But see Burt & Norris, supra note 12.
On the other hand, most commentators would allow preliminary defenses to be
raised on behalf of an incompetent defendant even without his participation or assist-
ance. See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YoRK, SPECIAL CoMMIr-
TEE ON THE STUDY OF COMMITMENT PROCEDURES AND THE LAw RELATING TO INcOM-
PETENTS, SECOND REPORT, MENTAL ILLNESS, DUE PROCESS AND THE CRIMINAL DEFEND-
ANT 108-11, 115 (1968); Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal De-
fendants, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 832 (1960); Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra
note 13, at 467-68. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
provides:
The fact that the defendant is unfit to proceed does not preclude any legal
objection to the prosecution which is susceptible to fair determination prior to
trial and without the personal participation of the defendant.
This proposal was discussed with approval in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 740-
41 (1972).
17. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1959). In adopting the "understand
and assist" standard the court stated:
We also agree with the suggestion of the Solicitor General that it is not
enough for the district judge to find that "the defendant [is] oriented to
time and place and [has] some recollection of events," but that the "test must
be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Id. (brack-
ets in original).
18. In Noble v. Siglar, 351 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1965), the defendant secured review
in federal court of his state court conviction by means of a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. The reviewing court held that since a federal constitutional right was involved
-namely, the due process right of an incompetent defendant not to be tried later an-
nounced in Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966)-the federal standard of com-
petence to stand trial enunciated in Dusky should be used in reviewing the state court
proceeding. 351 F.2d at 677. Contra, Ruffin v. Bailey, 354 F. Supp. 599 (E.D.N.C.
1966). See also 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 773, 778-79 (arguing that the Dusky standard applies
to the states directly).
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states, including Arizona, have codified this common law "understand
and assist" standard, 19 and the statutes of many of the remaining
states, which provide simply that no accused may be tried who is "pres-
ently insane,"2 0 have been judicially interpreted to incorporate it.21
But while appellate courts attempt to police the distinction between
mental illness in general and mental illness which impairs the .ability
to understand and assist, 22 it is the consensus of commentators that
the standards are loosely administered at the trial court level, in part due
to their vagueness.23 And, although a few writers believe that the ability
to make simple decisions is necessary to a correct finding of compe-
tence under the present "understand and assist" test,24 this common law
19. BRAKEL & RocK, Table 11.2, at 444-50 (categorizing all state statutes as of
1970). See, e.g., Aiuz. RULES OF CIMINAL PROCEDURE, rule 250 (1956); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 54.40 (1960), as amended § 54.40(a) (Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN.
19.1-228 (1960), as amended (Supp. 1973). See also WEIHOFEN 439.
20. See BRAKEL & ROcK, Table 11.2, at 444-50. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 426
(1959); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1367 (West 1970); FLA. R. CGiM. P. 1.210(a) (1968).
21. See, e.g., People v. Field, 108 Cal. App. 2d 496, 238 P.2d 1052 (1952);
Brock v. State, 69 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1954); BRACEL & ROCK 410. A number of other
states have recently changed their statutes from the "insanity" criterion to the common
law test, patterning them after the MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.04 (Proposed Official Draft
1962) which incorporates the "understand and assist" standard: e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. §
971.13 (1970), amending law originally passed as Ch. 631, § 130, [1949] Wis. Laws;
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.020(1) (Supp. 1973), amending lhv originally passed as § 1,
[18831 Mo. Laws 79.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Chisholm, 149 F. 284 (5th Cir. 1906); State v. Sev-
erns, 184 Kan. 213, 336 P.2d 447 (1959); Ex parte Hodges, 166 Tex. Crim. 433, 314
S.W.2d 581 (1958).
23. Some commentators have stated that this judicial laxity results from the vague-
ness of the competence standards themselves. See Burt & Norris, supra note 12, at
92; Robey, Criteria for Competency to Stand Trial: A Checklist for Psychiatrists, 122
Am. J. PsYcHiATRY 616, 621 (1965); Comment, Criminal Law, supra note 13, at 1082.
Others have indicated that the loose administration of the standards results from
the fact that in most cases, a psychiatrist's conclusion as to the presence or absence
of psychosis will be considered determinative. See BRAKEL & RocK 410; Note, In-
competency to Stand Trial, supra note 13, at 460. See generally A. MATrEEWS, supra
note 13, ch. 3. According to Matthews, "The [psychiatrists'] reports are usually 'boiler
plate' documents which pass muster only because the courts in fact routinely accept
the conclusions of the doctors." Id. at 86; cf. Splitt v. United States, 364 F.2d 594,
597-98 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1019 (1967) (holding that an earlier
release of a defendant from a mental hospital because he had been found "without
psychosis" amounted to the reinstatement of the presumption of sanity for the purpose
of competence to stand trial).
Of course, courts may in fact rely heavily on the opinions of psychiatrists only
because the standards are so vague as to leave the courts with no alternative method
of determining competence.
24. See Robey, supra note 23, at 619:
[The defendant] must decide with his lawyer upon a plea and approve the le-gal strategy to be used during the trial ....
...Occasionally, during the course of a trial, the problem of waiver of
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test itself is criticized for its lack of volitional elements. 25
It seems generally to have been assumed that this common law
standard of competence to stand trial serves as the standard for all pur-
poses of the criminal proceedings.26 Thus, absent a subsequent change
in the defendant's mental condition, a single finding of competence in a
pretrial competency hearing has been understood to settle the issue of
the defendant's competence to participate in all of the proceedings that
follow.27 Most courts, however, have generally applied the common
law "understand and assist" standard to the guilty plea without com-
ment or critical analysis. In order to plead guilty, therefore, it has
been required that a defendant must be capable of understanding the
proceedings and assisting in his own defense, even though no defense is
contemplated when a guilty plea is enacted. Before Westbrook,2"
the defendant's capability of waiving his constitutional rights after he
rights arises, and the patient must have some ability to make simple decisions
in response to well-explained alternatives.
Cf. Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 13, at 458.
25. See H. SitviNG, yupra note 16; McGarry, supra note 13, at 628 (1965), in
which the standard test is criticized for measuring only "knowledge or apperception,"
and failing to assess either "affect" (emotional state) or "the ability to act affirma-
tively" (volition).
26. See WEIOFEN 431; cf. Robey, supra note 23. But cf. Bell v. United States,
265 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. Miss. 1966).
27. See note 13 supra. It is not clear whether the defendant is bound by this ear-
lier determination of competence, supra note 13, or whether the subsequent proceed-
ings are merely conducted under a reinstated rebuttable presumption of sanity, infra note
43.
28. See, e.g., Kienlen v. United States, 379 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1967); Splitt v.
United States, 364 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1019 (1967); State
v. Alford, 98 Ariz. 124, 402 P.2d 551, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1020 (1965); State v.
Lewis, 11 N.C. App. 226, 181 S.E.2d 163 (1971). In re Williams, 165 F. Supp. 879
(D.D.C. 1958), seems to be the only case prior to Sieling which held that a defendant
may be competent to stand trial without necessarily being competent to plead guilty.
The court stated:
The issues involved in the plea of guilty and the consequences which attach to
a plea require a greater degree of awareness than the competency to stand
trial. The court may reasonably find, as it did in this case, that the latter
competency may exist and still not feel justified in accepting a guilty plea on
the defendant's behalf. Id. at 881.
Although Williams is still considered good law, cf. L. ORFmLD, CMiNAL PROCEDURE
U.NDER Tni FEDERAL RuLEs § 11:26 (1966), it must be noted that the case merely rec-
ognizes ground for the court, in its discretion, to refuse to accept a guilty plea; the case
does not hold, as did the Ninth Circuit in Sieling, that a guilty plea is invalid unless
the defendant is expressly found competent to make the plea.
It should be noted that the "understand and assist" standard has been applied to
the guilty plea only to determine a defendant's competency to plead guilty. After a
defendant is found competent to plead guilty under this standard, the validity of the
guilty plea in other respects must then be determined. See notes 30-44 infra and ac-
companying text.
29. See notes 45-48 infra and accompanying text.
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has been found competent to stand trial does not seem to have been
questioned.
THE GENERAL REQUISITES OF A VALID WAIVER OR GUILTY PLEA
The validity of a guilty plea or a waiver of constitutional rights
is determined by a second body of standards and procedures which
have developed independently of, and have been applied without
reference to, those used to determine competence to stand trial. Al-
though the constitutional requirements which govern the waiver of
rights and those which test the validity of a guilty plea are themselves
of distinct origin and differ in scope and detail, they impose a com-
mon prerequisite to the validity of any guilty plea or waiver-that it
be the result of the defendant's free and intelligent choice.80 The courts
30. Compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963); Adams v. United States ex
rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)
(waiver), with Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 801 (1970) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 728-29 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 179 (1946); Annot., 25 L. Ed. 2d 1025 (1971)
(guilty plea). For an analysis of the Johnson v. Zerbst standard that "[a] waiver is
ordinarily an international relinquishment of a known right or privilege," 304 U.S. at 464;
see Tigar, Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1,
8 (1970): 'This standard stresses the consensual, 'free choice' character of waiver and
its ultimate reliance upon the individual's freedom to forego benefits or safeguards
through the uncoerced exercise of his rational facilities."
See also D. NEWMAN, CONVICTIoN-THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNO-
CENCE WrrHouT TRIAL 10 (1960) (criticism of the proposition that "voluntariness"
is the sole constitutional criterion of the validity of a guilty plea). See also Shelton
v. United States, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957).
The fact that a plea or waiver is "voluntarily and intelligently" tendered by a
competent defendant does not mean that the court must accept it. Although a compe-
tent defendant may have had a common law right to plead guilty, see Arens, Due Process
and the Rights of the Mentally Ill: The Strange Case of Fredrick Lynch, 13 CATHOLIC
U. AM. L. REv. 3, 18 (1964), the Supreme Court has refused to recognize a constitu-
tional right to plead guilty. See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962)
(where the trial court refused to accept the guilty plea of a defendant charged with
a misdemeanor and, over his objection, entered a plea of not guilty by reason of in-
sanity). Furthermore, in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.11 (1971), the
Court stated:
Our holding does not mean that a trial judge must accept every constitution-
ally valid guilty plea merely because a defendant wishes to so plead. A crim-
inal does not have an absolute right under the Constitution to have his guilty
plea accepted by the court, although the States may by statute or otherwise
confer such a right (citations omitted).
See Comment, supra note 2, at 547.
Similarly, the Court also has rejected the contention that there exists a right to
waive a jury trial:
A defendant's only constitutional right concerning the method of trial is to an
impartial trial by jury. We find no constitutional impediment to conditioning
a waiver of this right on the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the trialjudge when, if either refuses to consent, the result is simply that the defendant
is subject to an impartial trial by jury-the very thing the Constitution guaran-
tees him. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965).
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have expressed this requirement for the validity of both a guilty plea
and waiver in similar language; in traditional terms, a guilty plea must
be "voluntarily and understandingly" made in order to be accepted."-
Similarly, under the standard imposed by the Supreme Court in Johnson
v. Zerbst,32 a waiver must be "intentional" and the right must be
"known."33 Although occasionally a court will acknowledge in passing
that it assumes the defendant to have some general "capacity" to make
the required intelligent choice,34 the courts have not made an affirma-
tive attempt to discern the presence of such a capacity, and the con-
cept of what constitutes the capacity to waive a constitutional right
or to plead guilty remains unelaborated. The focus of the courts' in-
quiry instead has been upon the defendant's background, his conduct
and the circumstances surrounding the tender of a waiver or plea; 5
the standard of validity for a waiver or plea is defined essentially in
terms of the absence of those factors which would render the choice
31. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927). Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970), approved as a standard for "voluntariness" the following
passage from Judge Tuttle's dissent in Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 115
(5th Cir. 1957):
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, in-
cluding the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, pros-
ecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises
to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled
or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature im-
proper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g.,
bribes).
According to Heberling, supra note 2, at 157, "voluntariness" and "intelligence" actu-
ally comprise a single standard, "voluntariness" being the "operative concept." See
also ABA STkmwADs, PLEAs oF GULTnY §§ 1.4-1.6 (Approved Draft 1968).
32. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
33. Id. at 464. The Supreme Court, in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), applied
this standard and emphasized the volitional element: "at all events we wish it clearly
understood that the standard here put forth depends on the considered choice of the
petitioner." Id. at 439 (emphasis added).
The standard was originally applied to the waiver of the right to counsel, Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), but has been extended to the waiver of fifth amend-
ment rights resulting from a pre-trial statement, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), and, in Fay v. Noia, to the waiver of the right to appeal, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
Certain rights, however, may be forfeited by actions not intended to operate as
a waiver. For example, the right to be present at trial may be forfeited by disruptive
behavior. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). See Tigar, supra note 30, at 9-
11, 16-19.
34. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 729 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 179 (1946); Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 277 (1942); United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir.
1964). Plattner, a case holding that there is a constitutional right to conduct a pro
se defense, seems to be unique in suggesting that an inquiry into the defendant's ca-
pacity to make a rational choice is a condition precedent to allowing his waiver of
counsel and self-representation at trial. Id. at 276.
35. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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involuntary-ignorance, mistake and unfair external pressure. 0  Men-
tal disability has been identified as one of these factors in dicta only,
apparently because of the common law rule that an incompetent de-
fendant cannot even be brought to trial and because the common law
standard is regarded as governing questions of competence.8 7
Because of the importance of the right to counsel in preserving
the free exercise of other constitutional rights in the criminal process,"8
an affirmative duty is imposed on the court to determine in advance
that a waiver of counsel is intelligently made and to indicate this clearly
in the record. 39  Furthermore, because a guilty plea carries with it the
waiver of several constitutional rights, this duty to assure that the
waiver is intelligently made has been extended to require the court to
conduct a colloquy with the defendant before accepting a guilty plea.4"
While such an inquiry, insofar as it is meant to probe the defendant's
intention and understanding, might properly be concerned with his ac-
tual state of mind, it usually consists instead primarily of the determina-
tion that no external factors existed which could have unfairly influ-
enced the guilty plea decision. Although the court is obliged to ask
whether the defendant understands the charges and the consequences
36. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (threats of discharge from em-
ployment made resulting incriminating statements inadmissible); Moore v. Michigan,
355 U.S. 155 (1957) (misleading statements by sheriff which led to a waiver of coun-
sel vitiated waiver); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948) (erroneous legal ad-
vice and ignorance of rights vitiated waiver of counsel and guilty plea). See also Heb-
erling, supra note 2, at 164-66; 42 COLUM. L. Rlv. 271, 278 (1942).
37. See notes 14, 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
This is not to say that mental incompetence would not be a theoretically adequate
ground for vacating a waiver, but rather that prior to Westbrook raising the issue of
competence in connection with a waiver would apparently have been tantamount to
questioning the validity of the entire proceeding.
However, the common law standard of competence to stand trial has not been ap-
plied in one area-pre-trial confession cases-where the "voluntary and intelligent"
standard is used instead. Thus the requirement of an intelligent choice may play a
more direct role in determining the measure of competence necessary for a valid waiver
of the fifth amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination inherent in a confes-
sion than it does in evaluating the validity of other constitutional waivers. See Black-
burn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1959); United States v. Silva, 418 F.2d 328,
330 (2d Cir. 1969). See also United States v. Bernett, No. 71-1465 (D.C. Cir. Jan.
10, 1974).
38. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) ("The purpose of the
constitutional guaranty of a right to counsel is to protect an accused from conviction
resulting from his own ignorance of his legal and constitutional rights. . . ."); Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) ('The right to be heard would be, in many
cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.").
39. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938); United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964).
40. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
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of pleading guilty, to explain them if he does not, and to inquire
whether he has been subjected to threats or coercion, the court may
accept his answers to these questions if they indicate an absence of coer-
cion or undue influence;41 the defendant does not have to demonstrate
his comprehension.42 Furthermore, in the ordinary case no inquiry
into -the defendant's mental capacity to make the plea is required-he
is presumed sane.43 Commentators agree that this colloquy is neither
designed for nor adequate for ascertaining mental incompetence. 44
Thus prior to Westbrook the competence-to-stand-trial and the
waiver/plea standards were employed in a complementary fashion:
the "understand and assist" standard was used to establish the defend-
ant's capacity to be tried and if this test were met, it was assumed that
the defendant had the capacity to waive his constitutional rights
and to enter a guilty plea; the voluntariness standard was used to vali-
date the competent defendant's waivers and pleas in all other respects.
Westbrook v. Arizona AND THE CASES INTERPRETING IT
In Westbrook v. Arizona,4 the Supreme Court prescribed a con-
41. The standard of "voluntariness" adopted in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742 (1970), also reflects this concern for external factors. See note 31 supra.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Goodman, 432 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1970). For an
indication that the "presence and advice" of counsel tends to mitigate otherwise coer-
cive factors, see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
43. Splltt v. United States, 364 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1019 (1967). Cf. Robinson v. Johnston, 50 F. Supp. 774 (N.D. Cal. 1943). But cf.
TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 26.13 (Vernon's 1966), under which no defendant's guilty
plea may be accepted ". . . unless it plainly appears that he is sane . . . ." This
statute has been interpreted to mean that a guilty plea is presumptive evidence of in-
sanity, requiring a finding to the contrary before the plea may be accepted. See, e.g.,
Sanders v. State, 18 Tex. Crim. 372 (1885).
44. D. NEwMA, supra note 30, at 24; Heberling, supra note 2, at 178. It is sug-
gested in ABA STANDARDS, supra note 31, § 1.6, Commentary, that adding a require-
ment that the court determine the factual basis of a plea before accepting it might
help reduce the risk of an incompetent's pleading guilty.
45. 384 U.S. 150 (1966). The Court's brief per curiam opinion reads as follows:
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a
writ of certiorari are granted. Although petitioner received a hearing on the
issue of his competence to stand trial, there appears to have been no hearing
or inquiry into the issue of his competence to waive his constitutional right to
the assistance of counsel and proceed, as he did, to conduct his own defense.
"The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of
itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused-whose life or lib-
erty is at stake-is without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious
and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is
an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused." Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 465; Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506.
From an independent examination of the record, we conclude that the
question whether this "protecting duty" was fulfilled should be re-examined in
light of our decision this Term in Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375. Accord-
ingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is vacated and the case
is remanded to that court for proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
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stitutional exception to the unwritten but general rule that finding of
competence to stand trial established competence for all purposes of a
criminal proceeding. The Court held that a finding of a defendant's
competence to stand trial does not establish his competence to waive
the right to counsel and to represent himself. The defendant in West-
brook, charged with murdering an attorney, waived counsel and unsuc-
cessfully defended himself. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ari-
zona" rejected his argument that the determination of his mental com-
petence to assist in his own defense under Arizona's Rule 250, govern-
ing competence to stand trial, did not amount to a finding that he was
mentally competent to conduct his own defense, and that his waiver of
counsel was therefore invalid. In a very brief opinion, the United
States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, stating:
Although petitioner received a hearing on the issue of his competence
to stand trial, there appears to have been no hearing or inquiry into
the issue of his competence to waive his constitutional right to the
assistance of counsel and proceed, as he did, to conduct his own de-
fense.47
Although Johnson v. Zerbst was cited by the Court for the proposition
that it is the trial court's responsibility to ascertain whether a valid
waiver of counsel has been made, the Court did not indicate what kind
of "hearing or inquiry" should have been conducted, nor did it explain
how such an inquiry would differ from the hearing under Rule 250.
Whether the "protective duty" imposed by Johnson v. Zerbst had
been fulfilled was to be determined on remand in light of Pate v. Robin-
son,48 a then-recent competence-to-stand-trial case which imposed a
duty on the court to conduct a hearing on its own initiative when facts
come to its attention indicating that the defendant might be incompe-
tent to stand trial.
Prior to Sieling, the Westbrook decision had gone largely unno-
ticed. The cases applying it, most of which concern the validity of a
particular defendant's waiver of counsel, 49 have drawn different con-
clusions as to what factor or factors present in Westbrook necessitated
46. State v. Westbrook, 99 Ariz. 30, 406 P.2d 388 (1965).
47. 384 U.S. at 150.
48. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
49. People v. Dumas, 51 Misc. 2d 929, 274 N.Y.S.2d 764 (Sup. Ct. 1966), appears
to be the only case in addition to Sieling which recommends an extension of the West-
brook rationale to other constitutional rights. It was suggested in Dumas that West-
brook might require the determination of the defendant's competence to make the
waiver of rights involved in a confession before a confession could be admitted into
evidence. At issue would be the defendant's ability to understand the Miranda warn-
ing.
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the additional inquiry as to the defendant's competence ,to waive coun-
sel-the decision to forego the assistance of counsel (that is, the waiver
itself), the defendant's subsequent self-representation at trial, or
both."0 In State v. Martin," the Arizona Supreme Court focused on
the first element, the defendant's competence to decide -to forego the
assistance of counsel, stating that neither the extent of the defendant's
legal skills nor the ultimate wisdom of his decision was relevant to the
waiver's validity.52  However, the Arizona court has not shown any in-
clination to broaden this reading of Westbrook to require a finding of
competence, in addition to that necessary to stand trial, for the waiver of
other constitutional rights or for the entry of a guilty plea." In con-
trast to the focus in Martin, two cases-State v. Kolocotronis"4 and
Virgin Islands v. Niles55-have placed emphasis on the second element,
the level of competence necessary for self-representation at trial, rather
than on that required for the making of the waiver." In Kolocotronis,
the Supreme Court of Washington held that due process is -violated if
a court allows a defendant to represent himself who does not have the
competence to do so.5 7 This narrow view of Westbrook seems to preclude
50. The difference may be significant since one who waives counsel and thereafter
pleads guilty does not need to conduct any defense.
51. 102 Ariz. 142, 426 P.2d 639 (1967).
52. Id. at 146, 426 P.2d at 643.
53. Factual situations in several subsequent cases have provided the opportunity to
apply Westbrook to the guilty plea. However, in State v. Davis, 106 Ariz. 598, 480
P.2d 354 (1971) (presentence report raises doubt as to competence at time of plea),
and State v. Rojas, 103 Ariz. 431, 443 P.2d 427 (1968) (failure to hold a competency
hearing invalidates a guilty plea), the Supreme Court of Arizona instead prescribed
the Rule 250/common law standard to determine the competence of guilty pleas. In
State v. Makal, 106 Ariz. 591, 480 P.2d 347, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 838 (1971), the
court faced a situation identical to that in Sieling but did not apply the Westbrook
rationale. There is no indication in any of these cases, however, that the defendant
argued for an extension of Westbrook.
54. 73 Wash. 2d 92, 436 P.2d 774 (1968).
55. 295 F. Supp. 266 (D.V.I. 1969).
56. In the Niles case, after finding the defendant competent to stand trial, the
court stated: "As for defendant's competency to waive counsel, the court is of the
opinion that one who may be suffering from paranoid delusions should not be en-
trusted with the sole conduct of his defense." 295 F. Supp. at 266.
Furthermore, the court in Kolocotronis stated: "[Westbrook] holds unequivocally,
that an adjudication by the trial court that an accused is capable of going to trial and
aiding his counsel, is not a determination of his competency to act as his own counsel."
73 Wash. 2d at 101, 436 P.2d at 781. Although stating at one point that the court
must assess both the defendant's competence to waive and his competence to defend,
the Kolocotronis court's further discussion indicates that the validity of the waiver
would ultimately be determined by the capacity for self-representation. Id. at 101-02,
436 P.2d at 781.
57. 73 Wash. 2d at 99, 436 P.2d at 779-80.
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its application to the waiver of rights other than the right to counsel since
it focuses on an issue associated only with the right to counsel-the capa-
bility for self-representation.
The reasoning inherent in this second approach was extended to
its logical conclusion in Splitt v. United States0 8 when the Sixth Circuit
expressly held that Westbrook applies only to cases in which the defend-
ant represents himself at trial. In Splitt, the defendant waived coun-
sel and pleaded guilty after a court-ordered psychiatric examination
had found him fit to proceed. After conducting a careful inquiry into
Splitt's understanding of the charges and the consequences of plead-
ing guilty, the trial court accepted his plea." The court of appeals held
that the guilty plea colloquy established the validity of the plea, noting
that, in view of the evidence against him, Splitt's decision was an
"intelligent one."60  Brushing aside the defendant's claim that West-
brook should apply, the court distinguished Westbrook on the grounds
that, although Splitt had waived his right to counsel, he had not at-
tempted to defend himself." Splitt reflects the general consensus of
the pre-Sieling cases that the specific competence required in West-
brook is that of self-representation-a competence peculiar to the
waiver of counsel; in addition, Splitt conflicts directly with Sieling
in holding not only that Westbrook cannot apply to invalidate a guilty
plea, but also that a guilty plea colloquy can validate the plea of a de-
fendant who has been found competent to stand trial.62
Sieling v. Eyman: TM CoURT's LoGIc
In Sieling, the Ninth Circuit, accepting the contention that the
Westbrook holding is sufficiently broad to invalidate a guilty plea even
where there has been no waiver of counsel, specifically held that the
finding of competence to stand trial under the Rule 250 (and common
law) standard was insufficient to establish Sieling's competence to plead
guilty. The court's opinion is ultimately syllogistic in character. Its
major premise is an expansive reading of the intended scope of the
Westbrook decision; although the court never specifically so states, it is
clear that it perceived the Westbrook rule to require a finding of com-
petence not only for the conduct of one's own defense at trial, but
also for the waiver of the assistance of counsel, and thus for the waiver
58. 364 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1019 (1967).
59. Id. at 595-97. Neither the trial court's original opinion nor the lower court's
dismissal of his motion to vacate te sentence was reported.
60. Id. at 598.
61. Id.
62. See text accompanying notes 67-68 infra.
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of all fundamental constitutional rights.6" The court's minor premise,
drawn from statements in Boykin v. Alabama,64 is that the plea of
guilty as a consent to judgment has all the consequences of a convic-
tion and involves the waiver of several important constitutional rights
-the fifth amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination and
the sixth amendment rights to a jury trial and to the confrontation of
witnesses.6 5 Under the broad major premise, the court concluded that,
since a finding of the defendant's competence to stand trial was held
insufficient for the waiver of a constitutional right in Westbrook, such
a finding cannot serve as an adequate evaluation of a defendant's
competence to make the waiver of constitutional rights which, accord-
ing to the Boykin minor premise, is inherent in a guilty plea.16
The guilty plea colloquy is, in the Sieling court's view, an equally
inadequate test of the validity of such a waiver because, as the court
notes, the colloquy is directed toward external circumstances and is
conducted under the presumption of sanity.67 Indeed, the court seems
to read Westbrook to imply that, once there is a question as to a de-
fendant's competence to act in his own behalf, the usual inquiry accom-
panying the waiver of other constitutional rights will likewise be in-
sufficient.68
Westbrook was further interpreted by the court as holding that
the traditional determination of a defendant's competence to stand trial
is insufficient to determine competence to plead guilty because that de-
termination does not measure the defendant's capacity "by a high enough
standard."6' 9 Although the court spoke of "level" and "degree," it pro-
ceeded to adopt a standard which seems to contemplate the assessment
63. Passages in Sieling commenting on the Westbrook opinion indicate that the
Sieling court interpreted Westbrook in this broad fashion:
The Court [in Westbrook] held that a trial court finding under Arizona Crimi-
nal Rule 250, that the defendant was competent to assist counsel in his de-
fense, did not suffice as a finding that he was also competent to waive such a
fundamental constitutional right as the right to the assistance of counsel. 478
F.2d at 213 (emphasis added).
We think Westbrook makes it plain that, where a defendant's competency has
been put in issue, the trial court must look further than to the usual "objec-
tive" criteria in determining the adequacy of a constitutional waiver. Id. at
214 (emphasis added).
At no point in the opinion does the court discuss the possibility that Westbrook might
be limited to self-representation or even to foregoing the assistance of counsel. See
notes 50-58 supra and accompanying text.
64. 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969).
65. See note 2 supra.
66. 478 F.2d at 215.
67. Id. at 214. See notes 39-44 supra and accompanying text.
68. Id. See note 63 supra (second passage quoted).
69. Id.
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of an ability different in kind from that measured by the "understand and
assist" test of competence to stand trial-namely, the capacity to make
a decision. Thus the Sieling court stated:
While the [Westbrook] Court did not suggest a standard, it is reasonable
to conclude from the Court's language that the degree of competency
required to waive a constitutional right is that degree which enables [the
defendant] to make decisions of very serious import.70
For competence to plead guilty, the Sieling court approved the stand-
ard suggested by Judge Hufstedler in her dissent in Schoeller v. Dun-
bar:
A defendant is not competent to plead guilty if a mental illness has sub-
stantially impaired his ability to make a reasoned choice among the
alternatives presented to him and to understand the nature of the conse-
quences of his plea.7'
The court considered this standard appropriate because "it requires
a court to assess a defendant's competency with specific reference to
the gravity of the decisions with which the defendant is faced. ' 72  Con-
ceding that a retroactive determination of competence is impossible
where a defendant was not examined at the time of a much earlier
original trial, the court concluded that, in view of the short interval be-
tween Sieling's competency hearing and his guilty plea, the psychiatric re-
ports and testimony at that earlier hearing might provide a basis for a
finding of his competence to plead guilty."8 This seems to indicate
that the court did not find it essential to the validity of a guilty plea
that the Sieling test be administered and that the finding be made at the
time the guilty plea is entered; instead in future cases the issue of the
defendant's competence to plead guilty could be determined along with
the defendant's competence to stand trial at a pretrial hearing.
70. Id. at 214-15. While this statement might seem to refer merely to a level of
cognitive functioning necessary for decision-making rather than to the ability to decide,
the standard adopted in Sieling for the guilty plea clearly focuses on this latter voli-
tional element. See text accompanying note 71 inIra.
71. 423 F.2d 1183, 1194 (9th Cir. 1970). Judge Hufstedler's suggestion of a new
competency standard for the guilty plea was merely tangential to the issue of the case,
the proper scope of review in a federal habeas corpus proceeding challenging a previous
finding of competence. It is significant for the understanding of the "volitional" stand-
dard suggested by Judge Hufstedler that the defendant in Schoeller was an unusually
intelligent and articulate person whose lucidity was unimpaired by the mental illness
he allegedly suffered. 423 F.2d at 1184-85. Because of the defendant's intelligence,
he probably possessed the cognitive component necessary to make a rational choice,
and as a result, had an evidentiary hearing been ordered, the issue of the defendant's
competence to plead guilty would have turned directly on the volitional element.
72. 478 F.2d at 215 (footnotes omitted).
73. Id. at 215-16.
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Sieling v. Eyman: RELIANCE ON WESTBROOK
In order to reach the Sieling court's conclusion that a finding of
competence to stand trial is not sufficient to establish competence to
plead guilty, it is necessary to establish that there are at least two stand-
ards of competence and that satisfying the competence-to-stand-trial
standard does not necessarily result in satisfying the standard for com-
petence to enter a guilty plea.
Although the Sieling court relied on Westbrook for both of these
propositions, Westbrook is inadequate support for the first and
very weak support for the second. Westbrook did not state that there
was a different standard or degree of competence even in the limited
right-to-counsel situation of that case, and the existence of such a sep-
arate standard is not a necessary implication of Westbrook.
The Sieling court reasoned that the additional hearing or inquiry
required in Westbrook would only be necessary because the first, which
established competence to stand trial, was "inadequate" to measure
competence needed to waive a constitutional right.74  Unfortunately,
the Westbrook Court did not explain exactly how the second inquiry
should differ, if at all, from the first, but instead, on the basis of its
"independent examination of the record," the Supreme Court simply
ordered the state supreme court to determine whether the Johnson v.
Zerbst "protective duty" to assure that the waiver of the right to counsel
be valid had been fulfilled in view of the Pate v. Robinson rule that the
trial court must conduct a hearing sua sponte, if facts indicating in-
competence come to its attention.7 5  If Westbrook, indeed, meant to
propose a new standard, it is difficult to see how a trial court might
have fulfilled its duty to ascertain the validity of a waiver without know-
ing the standard in advance, and it is similarly difficult to understand
how the Arizona Supreme Court on remand was to review the trial
court's actions without knowledge of the standard.
It is possible that the Supreme Court in Westbrook would have
been satisfied with an additional finding of competence made at the
time of the waiver without requiring a different type or degree of
competence.76 A reason for interpreting Westbrook as imposing such a
lesser requirement can be found in the facts that mental illness is fre-
74. Id. at 214.
75. See note 45 supra and text accompanying note 48 supra.
76. The Sieling court apparently did not consider the time of the waiver or plea
critical; instead, it would permit a determination of the defendant's competence to
plead or waive in an earlier general competency hearing. See note 73 supra and ac-
companying text.
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quently episodic 77 and that the defendant's mental condition may well
change in the often lengthy period of time between the competency
hearing, usually held at the time of arraignment, 78 and the trial itself."0
Since the waiver of counsel may be an unwise decision for even the
normal defendant,80 and one which a disturbed person might be more
likely to make, and since the incompetent defendant has an even greater
need for counsel's assistance than does the normal defendant,' the
Westbrook Court may have thought it a necessary precaution that a
court which has found reason to inquire into a defendant's competence
at an earlier stage of the proceedings should also ascertain whether that
defendant is still competent at the time he waives counsel.
Westbrook provides support for the second proposition-that
meeting the competence-to-stand-trial standard does not necessarily re-
sult in satisfying the competence-to-plead-guilty standard-only if
Westbrook can be interpreted as requiring a different type or degree
of competence (from that necessary to stand trial) for the waiver of
other constitutional rights in addition to the right to counsel. However,
it is impossible to view Westbrook as having established any rule appli-
cable to all fundamental constitutional rights, and thus to the entry of
a guilty plea, without considerably distorting its language. The only
references to constitutional rights in Westbrook are to the right to be
represented by counsel; the unqualified phrase "a constitutional right"
does not appear in the opinion.82 In addition, the waiver of the right
to counsel in Westbrook cannot be treated as the equivalent of the
77. For a description of the episodic nature of mental illness and the lucid inter-
vals which are especially characteristic of manic-depressive psychosis, see WniHoFnN
232-34.
The issue of episodic or intermittent incompetence has been raised in cases involv-
ing the use of narcotic drugs and alcohol. See, e.g., United States v. Goodman, 432
F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1970); Logner v. North Carolina, 260 F. Supp. 970 (M.D.N.C. 1966),
affld, 392 F.2d 222 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 857 (1968); State v. McFall,
5 Ariz. App. 539, 428 P.2d 1013 (1967). See also Heberling, supra note 2, at 178-
79.
78. Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 13, at 454.
79. See, e.g., Robey, supra note 23, at 619-20, where it is suggested that some pre-
diction of future stability should be included in the psychiatrist's report to counteract
the possibility that a change in a defendant's mental condition may escape notice.
80. See, e.g., State v. Beasley, 184 Neb. 649, 651, 171 N.W.2d 177, 178 (1969)
(waiver of counsel described as "a gross error in judgment").
81. Cf. Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally
Ill, 44 TFx L. REv. 424, 458 (1966), where it is suggested that in view of the helpless-
ness of the incompetent defendant and his inability to judge his attorney's actions, the
attorney be required to file reports to the court. See generally Chernoff & Schaffer,
supra note 16.
82. See notes 45 and 63 supra and accompanying text.
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waiver of other rights without regarding the Supreme Court's reference
to the defendant's "competence .. . to conduct his own defense"8 3
as mere surplusage. The Sieling court took no cognizance of the cases
interpreting Westbrook which focused on the competence to conduct
one's own defense.8 4
Insofar as Westbrook is susceptible to conflicting interpretations
as to its support for each of the two propositions-that there are at
least two standards of competence and that satisfying the competence
to stand trial standard does not necessarily result in satisfying the
standard for competence to enter a guilty plea-the result in Sieling
cannot be justified on the basis of Westbrook alone. 5
83. 384 U.S. at 150.
84. See notes 54-62 supra and accompanying text.
85. The Sieling court's heavy reliance on Westbrook perhaps also accounts for its
failure to give any consideration to the significant differences among the various rights
encompassed by any single standard for a competent waiver-first, with respect to the
interests those rights protect; second, with respect to the benefits to be gained from
their waiver and whether these benefits can be denied a defendant without jeopardiz-
ing the fairness of the proceedings; and third, with respect to the different situations
in which the rights appear in order to determine whether the demands of the situation
upon the defendant's competence increase the likelihood that his waiver will be involun-
tary.
For example, in the area of mental competency, the right to counsel might be
distinguished from all others in regard to the particular interests to be protected: it
is defendant's counsel in the first instance who is expected to raise the issue of compe-
tence at whatever stage of the proceedings it might become necessary. Cf. Seidner v.
United States, 260 F.2d 732, 733 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ("It would be anomalous indeed
to require a possibly incompetent person to present the issue of his own incompetency
while he repeatedly denies that he is now or ever has been mentally incompetent.");
Dooling v. Overholser, 243 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (no waiver of counsel permitted
in a commitment hearing). On the other hand, the benefits to be gained from the
waiver of counsel and particularly from a pro se defense seem minimal at best. See
note 80 supra and accompanying text. Thus it might be argued that an especially high
standard of competence be required for the waiver of counsel by a defendant who has
a history of mental illness.
In contrast, testifying in one's own behalf-which is probably essential for an ef-
fective defense in the normal case-entails at least a pro tanto waiver of the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination for the purposes of cross-examination,
Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958); Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S.
304, 315 (1900). In order to permit as many defendants as possible to use this means
of defense, the competence to make the automatic waiver which accompanies it might
be judged by a less rigorous standard.
And yet it is not clear that identical considerations would apply to the waiver
of the fifth amendment in the various situations in which it is found-e.g., the confes-
sion, the guilty plea and testimony at trial. For instance, it might be argued that
a higher standard of competence to make a rational choice is necessary in the inher-
ently coercive custodial interrogation situation. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
455, 457 (1966).
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SHOULD SEPARATE STANDARDS GOVERN COMPETENCE To STAND
TRIAL AND To PLEAD GUILTY?
The competence standard set forth in Sieling seems particularly
appropriate for both the waiver of constitutional rights and the entry
of a guilty plea because it focuses on the ability to make decisions.8"
In the form suggested by Judge Hufstedler, the standard consists of
both cognitive and volitional elements-the ability to make freely a
"reasoned choice," and the ability to understand its consequences un-
impaired by mental disability. The appropriateness of this standard re-
sults from the fact that it reflects the traditional requisite of any valid
guilty plea on constitutional waiver-that it result from a voluntary and
intelligent choice. Since mental disability may be seen as a factor
which, like coercion and ignorance, renders the defendant's action
"involuntary," the Sieling opinion can be seen as recognizing a stand-
ard for competence to plead guilty which is inherent in the require-
ments for waiver and for a guilty plea.8 7
On the other hand, the "understand and assist" test of compe-
tence to stand trial rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Sieling as an invalid
test of a guilty plea does not on its face purport to measure the ability
to make decisions.88 Instead, a defendant may proceed to trial if he has
adequate recall, present lucidity, and some reasoning ability.80 Thus,
the court could have quite properly ruled as an abstract proposition
that the Rule 250 test did not measure Sieling's ability to make a
"reasoned choice."
However, if the rationale for a decisional standard in a situation
in which a decision is required is accepted, it would seem that it is the
standard of competence to stand trial generally, rather than that neces-
sary for entry of a guilty plea, which should be reexamined. 0 In the
first place, for the normal defendant, the decision to go to trial rather
than enter a guilty plea is itself a critical one in the present criminal
justice system: one who exercises his right to go to trial and is found
86. See notes 30-36 supra and accompanying text.
87. By merely restating the existing standard of voluntariness in terms of another
vitiating factor-mental incompetence-the Sieling decision can be viewed as a clarifi-
cation of existing law; thus, rather than relying exclusively on Westbrook, the Sieling
court could have found additional support for its standard in the law surrounding the
waiver of constitutional rights.
88. See note 16 supra and notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1959) (quoted in part in note
17 supra); Schoeller v. Dunbar, 423 F.2d 1183 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 834
(1970); Powell v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 356, 361 (M.D. Ala. 1957); A. MAT-
TEws, supra note 13, at 19.
90. See note 16 supra and notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
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guilty may well be penalized by a stiffer sentence in a system which
encourages disposition of most criminal cases by plea bargain9 and in
which the prosecution is free to charge the defendant with multiple
counts for the same crime in order to strengthen its bargaining posi-
tion." In terms of pure mental ability, it would seem that the same
level of competence would be necessary for either pleading guilty or
not guilty. Under Sieling, only competence to make the former plea
is scrutinized. Second, the defendant at trial faces a number of deci-
sions which, though perhaps not as momentous as the decision of whether
to plead guilty, are at least as complex: he must decide, with the assist-
ance of his counsel, such things as whether to plead insanity, tempo-
rary insanity, alibi, or some other affirmative defense, and whether to
take the stand.93 Furthermore, the defendant at trial faces more than
decisions. For example, the demands of testifying and the rigors of
submitting to cross examination both heavily tax the abilities of a margin-
ally competent defendant.94
Thus, it is likely that an accurate finding of competence to stand
trial should require a level of competence equivalent to that required
to plead guilty.95 Furthermore, if the present standard permits or re-
91. See Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387
(1970). In Heberling, supra note 2, at 137-39, it is even suggested that plea bargain-
ing accompanied by reduced sentences is a universal and necessary component of the
present system of criminal justice. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recently given
express recognition to the role of plea bargaining in the criminal process; see, e.g.,
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), holding that a defendant has a due
process right to "specific performance" of his plea bargain. For a comprehensive dis-
cussion of plea bargaining and the role it plays in the criminal process, see D. NEw-
MAN, supra note 30.
92. See, e.g., Heberling, supra note 2, at 148. Sieling itself may represent an ex-
ample of this phenomenon, see text accompanying note 3 supra.
93. See Robey, supra note 23, at 619; Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, eupra note
13, at 458. See also Comment, Criminal Waiver: The Requirements of Personal Par-
ticipation, Competence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1262, 1267-68
(1966).
94. See Robey, supra note 23, at 619:
[If the circumstances of the case make it necessary, [the defendant] must
show the capacity to testify in his own defense. Generally speaking, if such
testimony is required, the level of competency should be higher.
The inability to testify in one's own behalf is one of the factors which traditionally
is supposed to render the trial of an incompetent unfair; there is always some possibil-
ity that, were the defendant competent, he would be able to bring forth the facts
needed to prove his innocence.
95. However, some commentators have assumed that a higher degree of competence
is required for competence to stand trial. See Chernoff & Schaffer, supra note 16, at
522 (discussion of the ethical dilemma presented to counsel when the defendant is cap-
able of entering a voluntary and intelligent plea but it is doubtful that he can with-
stand the rigors of trial); cf. Comment, supra note 93, at 1269-72 (criticizing the re-
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quires a defendant to go to trial without the capacity to make decisions,
then, whether or not this capacity is required for the entry of a guilty
plea, the defendant is not assured the "fundamental fairness" which
the law regarding competence seeks to provide.96
PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE Sieling DECISION
The court in Sieling may be criticized for failing to consider the
practical effects of its decision. Even assuming the correctness of the
court's conclusion that a higher level or a different type of competence
should be required to plead guilty than that required by the competence-
to-stand-trial test and that Westbrook requires this second standard, it
is possible that the establishment of a different standard such as that
set forth by the Sieling court will have no practical effect whatsoever.
Certainly the competency hearing can be modified to include an in-
quiry into the defendant's competence to waive constitutional rights.
But the differences between the levels or types of competence in ques-
tion may not be scientifically ascertainable, and, even if they were, un-
der the prevailing practice they might well be merged in a single de-
termination by the psychiatrists that the defendant is or is not mentally
M.
9 7
If Sieling's dual standard does have any practical effects, one may
be to create a class of semi-competent defendants who are not pro-
tected from prosecution because they have been found competent to
stand trial, but who are denied the leniency of the plea bargaining
process because they are not competent to plead guilty. 8  Further-
quirement of a personal waiver (Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) for various rights
at trial in view of the average defendant's inability to understand what is at issue, and
suggesting that pretrial waivers, especially those associated with the guilty plea, are
much less susceptible to this criticism). Id. at 1271 n.70. See also Uelmen, Compe-
tency to Stand Trial, in 1 CRimiNAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 17.02[2] (R. Cipes ed.
1973).
96. See WEmHOFEN 429; A. M&Trsmws, supra note 13, at 19.
97. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
98. There is evidence that charges are commonly reduced for defendants of low
mentality. D. NEvMAN, supra note 30, at 121-22. However, the "semi-competent"
defendant would have to rely completely on this prosecutorial or judicial discretion,
in contrast to the competent defendant, who is able to plea bargain-he can offer
to plead guilty in return for a reduced charge or sentence. As noted previously, one
commentator has suggested that plea bargaining accompanied by reduced sentences is
a universal and necessary component of the present system of criminal justice. Heber-
ling, supra note 2, at 137-39. It is ironic that, in attempting to protect a defendant's
rights by denying him the chance to plead guilty, the court may in fact expose him
to the same arbitrariness and discrimination against which constitutional rights are
supposed to protect.
This unfortunate position seems to be shared under existing law by those whose
guilty pleas may be refused by the court in its discretion on the ground that they
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more, it would seem to follow that because a court applying the Sieling
standard to ascertain competence to plead guilty is thus determining
the defendant's competence to waive other constitutional rights inherent
in a plea of guilty, these semi-competent defendants who are compe-
tent to stand trial but not competent to plead guilty will also be found
ineligible to waive other constitutional rights. 9
The purpose of the Sieling test is, of course, to protect the de-
fendant from the loss of his rights through an involuntary waiver. It
is true that under the Johnson v. Zerbst line of cases certain rigid pro-
cedures and standards of behavior are imposed upon the court and the
prosecution to protect against the state's power and the defendant's ig-
norance,100 and, consequently, it might seem that mental incompe-
tence should be treated like any other factor which subverts a de-
fendant's free choice and understanding. However, those external
procedures and standards of behavior are set up at the prosecution's
expense and serve to protect the defendant. Thus, it is far from clear
that the same rigidity is desirable for determining competence to plead
guilty since it may operate to hinder the defendant, rather than protect
him, and, by disallowing his waiver if he is judged incompetent, may
force him to exercise his rights and thereby cut off his ability to plead
guilty or waive other trial rights. 1
have a valid defense to the charges. Cf. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 732
(1962) (Clark, J., dissenting). Under Sieling's per se rule, the court does not have
discretion to accept or reject a guilty plea.
99. For example, Sieling gives no indication how the court will resolve the quandary
of the defendant who is incompetent to waive his fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination inherent in the guilty plea and who, upon being sent to trial, is by the
same measure incompetent to testify in his defense because of the fifth amendment
waiver his testimony involves. The decision not to testify may likewise involve the
waiver of a constitutional right. See United States v. McCord, 420 F.2d 255, 257 (D.C.
Cir. 1969). Contra, Sims v. Lane, 411 F.2d 661, 664-65 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 943 (1969) (making the point that in the federal courts the privilege of an ac-
cused to testify is merely statutory). This waiver must be made personally by the
defendant. Poe v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 173, 176 (D.D.C. 1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d
639 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
100. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (requiring a plea colloquy);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring a "warning" of the waiver of
rights involved in a defendant's statement in a custodial interrogation setting).
101. In Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942), the Supreme
Court recognized that a determination of competence to waive a constitutional right by
means of a mechanical test insensitive to individual differences is "to imprison a man
in his privileges," and to deprive him of his right to act in his own best interests.
Id. at 280. In other cases, where petitioners argued that a competent defendant should
have an unconditional right to plead guilty and to waive constitutional rights, the Court
has found this reasoning unpersuasive. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24
(1965); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962), discussed in note 30 supra.
A court, however, using the "reasoned choice" standard set forth in Sieling in a
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The Sieling decision, unless given only prospective effect,10 2 will
have a second practical result; it will create a new infirmity in the con-
victions of many persons who, like Gilbert Sieling, pleaded guilty after
being found competent to stand trial.103 Before Sieling, opportunity
flexible manner could avoid this problem by simply refusing to enforce a particular
waiver against a defendant when it appears that mental disability has played a substan-
tial role in the decision to make the waiver. For instance, in United States v. Silva,
418 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1969), the court allowed the withdrawal of a written waiver
of rights and a confession because the defendant, under the influence of narcotics, had
been incompetent at the time of the waiver. Such a flexible use of the standard would
differ greatly from a single pre-trial determination of the defendant's eligibility to make
all future waivers, and would eliminate this practical problem presented by the Sieling
decision.
102. The decision to apply a new constitutional rule only prospectively is not neces-
sarily itself a constitutional one, Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965), but
is rather a policy decision balancing a variety of considerations: the purpose of the
rule, i.e., whether it is essential to the fairness and accuracy of the proceedings, id
at 639; Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 294-95 (1968), or merely intended to have
a deterrent effect on future police behavior, Linkletter v. Walker, supra at 636-37; the
extent of reliance by the courts and law enforcement authorities on the prior law, Tehan
v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416-17 (1966), or whether instead the new
rule was clearly foreshadowed by preceding developments, Johnson v. New Jersey, 384
U.S. 719, 734 (1966); the effect of retroactivity on the administration of justice, Tehan
v. United States ex rel. Shott, supra at 418; and whether the defendant has had
alternative means of vindicating his rights, Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730
(1966). In Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 508-09 (1973), a case giving retroactive
effect to a double-jeopardy rule, the Court held that this balancing approach is not
necessarily applicable to what it called "non-procedural" rules. Compare Gosa v. May-
den, 413 U.S. 665 (1973).
If the balancing approach is used to determine whether to limit the Sieling stand-
ard to prospective effect, the Ninth Circuit will face conflicting equities. On the one
hand, the reliance of courts and prosecutors on the applicability of the competency to
stand trial standard to guilty pleas is substantial, and, even if it could be argued that
the Sieling standard was inherent in the law of the waiver or that Westbrook provided
a compelling basis for the Sieling decision, Sieling was not adequately foreshadowed
by either of these facts. In addition, the effect on the system of justice may also be
substantial; many convicted defendants may seek habeas corpus relief on the basis of
Sieling.
On the other hand, under common law the conviction of an incompetent defend-
ant is absolutely void, primarily because of the unfairness and unreliability of such
a conviction. It seems, therefore, that full retroactive effect should be given under
the Sieling standard to grant habeas corpus relief to a defendant who was in fact lack-
ing the ability to make a rational choice. The more difficult question is whether the
full reach of the Sieling rule should be allowed retroactive effect to afford defendants
in cases similar to Gilbert Sieling's a review of their convictions merely because a com-
petency hearing has put their competence at issue without resolving the question of
their competence to plead guilty. In such cases perhaps a "harmless error" threshold
could be used to require the defendant to make some showing of possible prejudice.
See Johnson, The Supreme Court of California 1967-68-Foreword: Retroactivity in Re-
trospect, 56 CALiF. L. REv. 1612, 1631-32 (1968).
103. Although statistics do not seem to be available which indicate accurately the
number or percentage of defendants who have both been determined competent to stand
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for collateral attack of the validity of convictions in competence cases
seems to have been limited to cases in which the court failed to hold a
hearing when reasons for doubting competence were before it,104 or to
cases where the defendant could actually prove he had been incompetent
at the time of the trial or the guilty plea.'1 5 A judicial finding of
trial and have pleaded guilty, the following figures may be helpful in assessing the im-
pact of Sieling on the criminal justice system: (1) According to Bacon, Incompetency
to Stand Triaf" Commitment to an Inclusive Test, 42 S. CAL. L. Rav. 444 (1969) (citing
figures from a 1964 survey of the federal system) slightly less than 9 percent of
all defendants make the motion for a pre-trial psychiatric examination-which is ap-
parently granted as a matter of course in many cases. See Kaufman, supra note 13,
at 474-76. (2) Of those defendants examined, the great majority are found competent
to stand trial. See ASSOCIATION OF Trm BAR op THE CrTy OF NEw YoRK, SPECIAL COM-
mTrTEE ON THE STUDY OF COMMrrMENT PROCEDURES AND THE LAw RELATINa TO IN-
COMPETENTS, SECOND REPORT, MENTAL ILLNESS, DUE PRocEss AND Tm CRIMINAL DE-
FENDANT 88-89 (1968); Bacon, supra at 445 n.7 (72% in the federal system); Rosen-
berg, Competency for Trial-Who Knows Best?, 6 CuM. L. BuLL. 577, 578 (1970)
(slightly over 90% in Massachusetts). (3) Presumably a high proportion of these
defendants in turn plead guilty. According to Heberling, supra note 2, at 137, "roughly
909" of all criminal defendants plead guilty. Thus, it would seem that Sieling may
affect a significant number of criminal defendants.
By eliminating the indefinite commitment of defendants who are incompetent to
stand trial, Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), discussed supra note 13, will both
reduce the number of defendants presently confined and encourage a number of de-
fendants to plead incompetence who would otherwise have been deterred from so plead-
ing by the prospect of indefinite commitment. See Comment, An End to Incompetency,
supra note 13, at 572-74. Cf. Chernoff & Schaffer, supra note 16, at 520. However,
that decision will have little effect, if any, on the number of already convicted defend-
ants who may seek relief under the rule of Sieling because Jackson governs the cases
of those found incompetent to stand trial, whereas Sieling concerns those found com-
petent who have subsequently pleaded guilty.
104. See, e.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Lee v. Alabama, 386 F.2d
97 (5th Cir. 1967). Under this "right to a hearing" theory the reviewing court can
make a nunc pro tunc determination of competency if the record can be adequately
reconstructed and the lapse of time is not too great, see, e.g., People v. Hudson, 19
N.Y.2d 137, 225 N.E.2d 193, 278 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1967). Otherwise the defendant is
entitled to a new trial, Lee v. Alabama, 386 F.2d 97, 105 (5th Cir. 1967); United States
ex rel. Cole v. Follette, 301 F. Supp. 1137, 1149-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). After the de-
fendant demonstrates that the original trial court had reason to doubt his competence,
the burden is shifted to the state to prove that the defendant had been competent at
trial. Thus the defendant need not prove actual incompetence. People v. Thompson,
36 IU. 2d 332, 223 N.E.2d 97 (1967).
105. See, e.g., Bostic v. United States, 298 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Taylor v.
United States, 282 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1950). Under the approach of these cases it is
not necessary that the court have been put on notice of the defendant's mental condi-
tion; his appearance of sanity and failure to raise the issue at trial do not bar relief.
Taylor v. United States, 282 F.2d at 22. However, the petitioner must prove his in-
competence under this approach by a preponderance of the evidence. Crail v. United
States, 430 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1970). See generally Schoeller v. Dunbar, 423 F.2d
1183, 1189-91 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 834 (1970) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
See also Swadron, Collateral Attack of Federal Convictions on the Ground of Mental
Incompetency, 39 TEMPLE L.Q. 117 (1966). See note 13 supra.
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competence to proceed, however, was binding unless found to be clearly
erroneous. 10 6 The result after Sieling is that even in cases in which
the court in reliance on existing law took care to determine whether
the defendant was competent to stand trial under the "understand and
assist" standard, a defendant may be able to reopen his case; he need
only prove that he had not been specifically found competent to plead
guilty in order to receive review. Where it is not possible to make a
retroactive determination of his competence to plead guilty, the defend-
ant will be entitled to a new trial,107 which for many defendants may
resul, in release rather than retrial.
CONCLUSION
The issues raised in Sieling invite a general inquiry into the ade-
quacy of the common law test of competence to stand trial and its ap-
plication to the guilty plea and the waiver of constitutional rights.
While the standard of competence adopted by the court does provide
an essential element heretofore lacking in the assessment of compe-
tence-a requirement that a defendant be able to make rationally the
decisions necessary to both a plea of guilty and a valid waiver of con-
stitutional fights-it may be argued that the court relied on an over-
broad reading of Westbrook in erecting the requirement that this stand-
ard be used to judge the validity of all constitutional rights. Further-
more, having imposed this standard of competence on the entry of a
guilty plea, the court failed to consider the possibility that this standard
should also apply to the determination of the defendant's competence
to stand trial. One practical effect of this limited application of the
standard may be to create a class of semi-competent defendants who
are competent to stand trial but incompetent to plead guilty, and will
therefore be ineligible for the more lenient treatment resulting from the
plea bargaining process. 0 s On the other hand, Sieling may also furnish
convicted defendants who waived one or more rights a technical basis
for obtaining review.'09 To avoid such results, it is strongly recom-
mended that this new decisional standard be incorporated into the
standard for competence to stand trial, thereby protecting the volition-
ally incompetent defendant from the criminal process as well as from
an involuntary plea, while at the same time avoiding the problems
inherent in a dual standard of competence.
106. See Hanson v. United States, 406 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1969); Krupnick v. United
States, 264 F.2d 213, 217 (8th Cir. 1959); Hill v. United States, 223 F.2d 699 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 867 (1955).
107. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
108. See notes 98-101 supra and accompanying text.
109. See notes 103-07 supra and accompanying text.
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